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ANTHROPIC EXPLANATION IN COSMOLOGY
Ernan McMullin

Since Collins and Hawking described the need for an unimaginably precise
flatness in the early universe, many have argued that the cosmos thereby
requires design. This essay traces the developments of these design speculations from the Collins-Hawking discovery in 1973 to the present, and
describes the four possible responses that are available to the apparent finetuning of the universe.

Anthropic explanation is commonplace in some parts of the human sciences:
in archaeology, physical anthropology, and paleontology, for example. To
identify a piece of flint found in a riverbed as an arrowhead, i.e., as the product of human agency, calls for specifically “anthropic” explanation, that is,
one that refers directly or indirectly to human agency or to human presence
more generally. In the first attempts at a cosmology consonant with the new
“mechanical philosophy” of the seventeenth century, there was a tension
between the Cartesian goal of constructing such a cosmology utilizing mechanistic modes of explanations only and the efforts of Christian scholars like
Bentley, who in reaction against the Cartesian program insisted on involving
the Creator in a more evident way in the formation of the cosmos, often
invoking an “anthropic” element, human flourishing, as the Creator’s
motive for ensuring, for example, the stability of the solar system.
Descartes believed that his new mechanics was, in principle, sufficient to
explain how the present universe in all its complexity could originate over
the course of time from an initial “chaos” of particles in motion. By specifying a “chaos” as a sufficient starting-point, he was implicitly taking for
granted a Principle of Indifference, meaning that no constraint had to be set
on the original configuration for the present-day cosmic complexity to
develop from it.1 Any configuration would be sufficient, as would the most
general laws of mechanics as Descartes had derived them. An implicit regulative principle of this kind would dispense with the possibility that a special initial configuration of some sort might be required in order to arrive at
the later complexities of our world; in that case, the cosmologist would be
faced with the additional task of explaining why this configuration, rather
than others, distinguished the initial cosmic state, a task that obviously transcended the capacities of the mechanical philosophy.
Descartes simply took this simplifying idealization for granted. But in
later cosmology it would crystallize into a quite explicit regulative princiFAITH AND PHILOSOPHY
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ple, as we shall see. For one thing it would serve to exclude anthropic elements from the issue of cosmic origins. And this is just what, unexpectedly, came into question in twentieth-century cosmology, once that issue
came within the actual reach of the cosmologist with the appearance of socalled “Big Bang” theory.
1. Getting “our” universe started

The anthropic flurry so much in evidence in cosmology today began in the
early 1970s when quantum theorists began to investigate the novel field of
research opened up by the extension of the postulated Big Bang expansion
back to its first moments, when the immense energies would involve all
sorts of quantum effects. In 1973, Collins and Hawking came up with a
most unexpected, and to them most unwelcome, entailment.2 The only
way, they said, for our universe to be as isotropic as ours is after so long a
period of expansion is for its initial energy-density to be at the borderline
between values that would lead to a runaway expansion and values that
would lead to rapid collapse. The cosmic geometry would have to be
“flat” to begin with to an almost unimaginably precise degree.
This finding was unwelcome because it challenged the Cartesian principle of indifference that had implicitly informed cosmology for so long.
Were “chaos” to be sufficient to give rise to the sort of universe we now
have, no question would arise about why its parameters had the evidently
contingent initial values they had. But if the present universe severely constrains the range of possibilities for a plausible starting-point, a question
about the significance of that constraint immediately presents itself, or so
Collins and Hawking believed. Their guess was that the significance was
anthropic in nature and that some sort of selection effect was responsible.
The conditions necessary for the development of intelligent life: galaxies,
planets, heavy elements etc. can only occur in a very long-lived universe.
But a long-lived universe is the only kind that we could inhabit. The universe has to be long-lived because we are here!
But a necessary condition does not qualify as an explanation. A further
premise is needed, and one immediately suggested itself to the authors.
There had already been talk of “branching” worlds in attempts to understand wave-packet collapse in quantum theory. What if there was, not
just one world, but a very large number of (actual) worlds characterized
by, in effect, the widest range of possible initial conditions, specifically of
energy-density? In that case, one could expect that there would be one or
a small number in that ensemble of worlds satisfying the energy-condition
that would give rise to our sort of long-lived world, thus permitting the
evolution of humans.
The existence of a sufficient number of worlds to make this outcome
unsurprising would “explain” why we find ourselves in a world whose
initial conditions seem so finely tuned for our eventual appearance. The
plurality of worlds possessing the requisite range of initial conditions is the
explanation therefore, of what originally seemed puzzling. In another
sense, it explains away the apparent fine-tuning. There was no fine-tuning
after all, strictly speaking. Rather, there was a selection effect at work. The
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kind of universe we find as we theorize back to cosmic beginnings is the
one that our complex physical make-up effectively “selects” for us.
This pushes the Principle of Indifference up to a higher level. The
unspecified initial condition (the “chaos”) is now an ensemble of worlds,
not of particles in motion within a single world. To get to “our” sort of
world, once more we need not lay any special constraint on what the initial
“given” should be like, in terms of energy-density at least. The constraint
only enters when one asks which of the worlds within that “given” are
suitable for the possible evolutionary development of intelligent life.
What is significant here is the constraint that the human presence places
on the cosmic starting-point. Exactly the same constraint would be called
for by the presence of beetles or oak trees. But there would be no selection
effect in their case: they do not pose questions that implicitly assume a
selection effect on the part of the questioner. The explanation afforded by
postulating a selection over a multiplicity of worlds is thus properly
anthropic. But is there an anthropic principle here?
2. Carter’s “anthropic principle”

The anthropic reasoning involved in the Collins-Hawking argument was
dignified by Brandon Carter the following year with the label, “anthropic
principle”:3 “What we can expect to observe must be restricted by the conditions necessary for our existence as observers.” As it stands, this is, of
course, quite trivial-sounding. And Carter complicated matters by introducing also a “strong” version of the principle: “The Universe must be such
as to admit the creation of observers within it at some stage.” This either
reduces to the first (“weak”) form or makes an implausible claim, depending on the force given the term, ‘must.’4 The ambiguities of the Carter article have given rise to an abundant literature. It may be best to dispense
with the notion of a “principle” here; it promises too much. Or if one must
have one: “in an expanding universe, watch out for selection effects!”
Finding an initial cosmic parameter constraint where none was expected
led physicists to ask: was there a reason for it? And a selection effect gives
an elegant answer. But, of course, the postulate on which it depends is
highly speculative. The vigor with which it was propounded in the 1970s
by Hawking, Carter, and many others testifies as nothing else could do to
their commitment to the principle of indifference: in the absence of even
the slightest independent theoretical reason to suppose that the ensemble
of worlds displaying the requisite range of the relevant parameter actually
exists, they propounded the many-world scenario as though the solution it
offered of the apparent “fine tuning” puzzle was evidence enough in its
support, despite its extraordinary ontological extravagance.
What prompted Collins and Hawking to propose their many-world scenario in the first place was the extreme constraint required for a single
parameter, an initial condition: the energy-density. But Carter pointed to
another source of constraints of a significantly different sort. The energydensity seemed, to all intents and purposes, to be an entirely contingent
matter: so far as one could tell, it could have the widest possible finite
range that theory allowed over a multiplicity of “worlds” that constituted a
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single “universe,” the universe itself remaining the same kind of universe.
But what if the many worlds of the anthropic solution vary in a more fundamental way, exhibiting different basic constants, different “laws of
nature”?
Here came the second great surprise, the second challenge to the cherished principle of indifference. If the strong nuclear force binding nucleons
into nuclei were only very slightly weaker relative to the other three fundamental forces, Carter notes, hydrogen would be the only element. If the
gravitational force were slightly stronger, planets might not form. If the
fine-structure constant were “increased by only a very small amount,” likewise planets might not form. So it begins to seem that there is a much
more fundamental set of cosmic constraints imposed by the anthropic
requirement. Carter was more interested in explaining in this way why the
gravitational force should be so extraordinarily weak, relative to the other
three forces. (He leads into his article by recalling Dicke’s invocation of a
selection effect in the context of the large-number coincidences.) But his
implication was clear: one may well find that there are all sorts of nomic
constraints, constraints on the laws of physics themselves, for a universe to
develop in a potentially life-bearing way.
And find such nomic constraints physicists did. Indeed over the next
decade it became almost a parlor game to juggle with the balance between
the four forces to see what would happen in the ensuing cosmic scenario:
only helium if the strong nuclear force were as little as 2% stronger; only
hydrogen if it were 5% weaker. The existence of supernovas, of planets, of
carbon, was shown to depend fairly sensitively on the values the constants
actually have in our universe.5 An appeal to an anthropic selection effect
once again suggested itself.
This time, however, the requisite many-world postulate was much more
problematic. It was one thing to conjure up worlds differing only in their
contingent energy-densities. It was at least conceivable that an overarching
theory might be found in which a single universe might give rise to such a
multiplicity of component worlds, causally linked, say, at their origin and
hence, in principle at least, theoretically accessible. But nomic variation was
another matter. Was it even permissible? Might not the relationships
between the physical constants be necessarily what they are? What sort of
super-theory could be imagined that would govern the sorts of variation
that this new appeal to the anthropic entailed?
3. The teleological alternative

The physicists who discovered the different sorts of initial parameter constraint that are implicit in the development of the long-lived, planet-bearing, heavy-element-forming universe we know, saw those constraints as
significant and dealt with the consequent demand for explanation by
invoking the anthropic dimension of the universe. The constraints are a
logical consequence of that dimension, if the many-world postulates were
granted. But might not the constraints be significant in a quite different
sense, one more familiar than a selection effect, when tracing a reason for
an earlier in a later. Might they not be a teleological consequence instead?
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It was not hard to see how this might be. The familiar story of creation
shared by all three Abrahamic faiths postulates a Creator on whom the
existence and nature of the world depends.6 The Biblical story describes a
universe whose contents are of the Creator’s shaping that is brought into
existence at a moment of time. Medieval Christian theologians elaborated
on this metaphysical theme and argued, for example, that time itself was
the creation of a Being who existed beyond time (Augustine), and that
even were the universe to be eternal, as Aristotle had held, it would still
need a Creator-cause to account for its existence and nature (Aquinas).
But a second premise is also needed, a more specifically theological one.
Human beings play a special role in the universe story as this unrolls in the
Bible and the Koran. They are said to be made in the Creator’s image; they
appear to be the object of the Creator’s special concern. Their abilities set
them apart from the rest of the creation: their combination of reason and
freewill makes them capable of a response to the Creator (of love, of
acknowledgement, of denial) that no other beings can claim. The sacred
books of all three faiths tell of a God who is intimately involved in the
doings of His people. There is a third premise implicit in all this too; that
the Creator is not just an impersonal force or energy of some unimaginable
sort but a being capable of concern whose creative agency is guided in
some sense by an analogue to what humans would call purpose.
If these three premises are granted, then cosmic constraints are easily
explained. To the extent that the advent of the human plays a significant
part in the Creator’s purposes, it was to be expected that whatever constraints on the original shaping were necessary for that purpose to be fulfilled would in fact have been incorporated by the Creator. If the universe
is regarded as a Creation, then the characteristic ways of acting (the “laws
of nature”) and the initial conditions (e.g. initial energy-density) would be
set by the Creator’s agency. And if the universe were to be “anthropic,”
capable of evolving to the level of the human, the Creator would simply
elect those constraints on the limitless possibilities of creation that would
make this outcome possible.
This is an anthropic explanation but in yet another sense. It does not
appeal directly to human agency as an archaeological explanation might.
It does not see the constraints as a selection effect attributable simply to the
anthropic involvement in the posing of the original question. The anthropic dimension appears rather, in the purposes of the Creator: the act of
Creation is deemed to have been guided by purpose and the capacity of
the universe to be human-bearing was part of that purpose. This conforms
to the familiar model of teleological explanation, but of course the context
is a far from familiar one, one where the very notion of purpose stretches
the limits of analogy.
An important feature of this way of understanding the problematic initial constraints is that, unlike most “Design” arguments of past natural theology, this does not involve any sort of miraculous intervention of the
Creator in natural process, no momentary setting aside of the normal operations of the laws of nature. If the notion of a purposive Creator is admitted in the first place, this automatically entails a choice on the Creator’s
part of the sort of universe that conforms to the Divine purpose. Electing
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the constraints that in this respect allow the universe to conform is thus
simply implicit in the very Creation postulate itself.
In this perspective, the metaphor of “fine-tuning,” with its implication
of a Tuner, is entirely appropriate. Not surprisingly, critics of the theistic
alternative,7 object to it as implicitly begging the question. I have used the
neutral term, ‘initial parameter constraints,’ deliberately here and there in
order to avoid any misunderstanding. A further reason for this choice is
that it focuses attention on the essential element: the constraint on values
that according to the principle of indifference one would expect to be
unconstrained. The degree of constraint makes a difference to the motivation for seeking an explanation: the tighter the constraint, the greater the
motivation, as Collins and Hawking recognized.
The teleological alternative is clearly not scientific. It relies on both
metaphysical and theological considerations. Those who rule out such
considerations and limit explanation in the cosmological domain to natural
science alone will, of course, rule out the teleological alternative also.
Those who are led to postulate a Creator on traditional metaphysical
grounds might still balk at the anthropic move that relies rather more on
theological supplementation. But for those who already accept the view of
creation implicit in the Jewish, Christian, or Islamic traditions, the teleological alternative could seem a plausible choice; given their background
beliefs, the anthropic solution could neatly account for initial cosmic constraints. The overall explanation is, of course, a theistic one. But it is the tie
to the anthropic dimension of the universe that makes it work.
Many philosophers of religion were intrigued by these unexpected
developments in cosmology and debate began as to the weight that should
be given them. Some took the opportunity to advance a full-scale natural
theology centering on cosmology and emphasizing the anthropic-theistic
dimension of the new scientific findings.8 Others were more hesitant; arguments from design: singling out features of the world that could best (or
only) is explained by invoking the action of a Creator/Designer has not had
a good record. Proponents of the new argument responded that it did not,
as the earlier arguments had done, rely on an explanatory gap on the side of
science, something that science ought to be able to explain but apparently
cannot. The anthropic argument was in fact prompted in the first instance
by scientific findings and continues to rest on those. It proposes an agentcausal explanation of the origin of physical laws and initial cosmic conditions, a topic that lies outside the scope of physical science to begin with.
But what if the original scientific claim had been in error or at least premature? What if the alleged constraints were, in fact, not necessary? What
if the cosmologists could provide not just a possible non-teleological alternative explanation (the anthropic selection effect did not have many
defenders at the time) but also a reason to believe that there was nothing to
explain?
4. Inflation and after

In 1980, Alan Guth proposed an ingenious, if highly speculative, way of
accounting for the present “flatness” of the universe, the problem from
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which the whole anthropic discussion had begun in 1973, without requiring the almost unimaginably precise “flat” setting of the initial energy-density. His proposal affected only the first fraction of a second of the cosmic
expansion, leaving the standard Big Bang theory to handle the rest.
Suppose a phase transition occurred that brought about a gigantic expansion, multiplying the diameter of the point-like universe by a mind-boggling factor of the order of 1050 and then stopping as suddenly as it began.
The effect of this would be to force the energy-density, no matter what its
initial value might have been, towards the desired “flat” value that would
then be maintained. No need, then, for any constraint on the initial value:
the principle of indifference is once more in command.
Guth’s “inflation” model was prompted in the first instance by the
apparent parameter constraint that the initial state required. He regarded
this latter as a “peculiar situation” that could not be left to stand. And the
many-world alternative evidently did not appeal to him. What is interesting is to note how the strong the motivation was on his part and on that of
many other leading cosmologists, to get rid of the troublesome initial constraints that gave rise to such strange anthropic fancies. Guth’s model, like
any first try, faced a number of serious technical difficulties, most of which
have been overcome in the years since then by introducing a number of
major modifications. Vigorous attempts have been made to find independent observational support for the inflation hypothesis; some success is
claimed, for example, in it’s predicting the amplitudes of the tiny fluctuations in the cosmic microwave background.9 Its major promise is to offer
hope of explaining how in such an isotropic universe the galaxies could
have begun to form: the inflation ratio is so great that quantum fluctuations could have been enormously amplified to form the galactic seeds.
The notion of inflation has itself meanwhile been inflating: once inflation
be admitted, some theorists have argued that it can happen over and over
in separate domains, generating new “bubble” universes at no time causally
connected with one another. The ensemble of such universes (now “universes,” no longer “worlds”) has been called a “multiverse.” Thus, inflation, originally proposed as a way of avoiding the anthropic line of argument
has, rather ironically, given fresh life to it. The most speculative of the multiverse theorists, the Russian physicist Andrei Linde, would have every
other sort of universe out there somewhere, popping endlessly in and out of
existence in an infinite space-time. These universes would exhibit the
widest variety of basic constants; their laws, even their space-time dimensionality, would range as far as the theorist’s imagination might let them.
It must be emphasized that these last theoretical forays are still not
much more than imaginative constructions, a series of ever more daring
“what-ifs.” But they do bear on the second form of parameter constraint
discussed above: the tight constraints on the basic constraints of nature
that the development of an anthropic universe calls for. Even if the energy-density issue were to be explained away by inflation in our own universe, the more significant parameter constraints are assuredly the
“nomic” ones, those embodied in the laws of physics themselves.
The multiverse scenario would once again restore the principle of indifference, now at an even higher level, that of an ensemble of universes, each
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displaying a different nomic configuration. And the anthropic selection
effect would once again come into play: we are in a unique universe
among the vast ensemble of “bubble” universes out there, the one that has
the “right” mix of physical constants. But for the moment, this is no more
than the hand-waving of a very bright physicist. Our own universe, even
if inflation is added in, still displays the tight nomic constraints that have
seemed to many to call out for explanation of some sort. To handle these
by invoking a selection effect, a multiverse of the Linde kind would be
needed. And that price would seem, at the present juncture at least, to be
too high. But its in-principle possibility must be kept in mind.
5. Four alternatives

In the light of the developments in cosmology of the last thirty years, there
would seem to be four, and only four, alternative ways of dealing with the
cosmic parameter constraints that have recently come to light. And adjudicating between them is extraordinarily difficult, given the lack of agreement on the proper criteria to employ and given also that cosmology itself
is in such a state of explosive development. Still, to finish, it may be worth
summing up the prospects for each of the four alternatives.
a. Happenstance: The constraints on initial cosmic conditions and on the
law of physics themselves imposed by the anthropic requirements are
taken to be real. But they are declared to be just a matter of chance. The
universe just happens to be that way: why not? If it were to be at all, it had
to be some way. And, lucky for us, that is just the way it is.
This is perhaps the least favored of the alternatives. Most scientists are
uneasy about this dismissive way of dealing with coincidence, even in a world
where quantum chance seems pervasive. Time and again, ever since the original constraint on initial energy-density came to light, cosmologists have devised
highly speculative theoretical constructions either to show that the supposed
parameter constraint is in fact illusory (Guth), or to provide an anthropic means
of restoring the valued principle of indifference (Collins and Hawking). They
could have said: well, that is just the way it was: a matter of chance like the
moment at which a radioactive atom disintegrates. But they didn’t . . .
What struck them was, of course, not the initial state alone: considered
in isolation, one specification of that state would seem as likely as another.
It was the apparently tight correlation between that state and a later history
that to all appearances would have been altogether different had the initial
state been only slightly different on the scale of the parameter itself. Was
this significant or not? Was there some feature of that later history that
might help to explain the correlation? One could argue that this is to push
the demand for explanation too far. But physicists are wont to push that
demand as far as it will go.
b. Are the constraints real?: A different response would be to question
whether the supposed constraints are themselves real. What if they reflect
merely a temporary stage in theory-development? If history is any guide,
how can one be confident that constraints of this sort will survive theorychange? Might there not be a return to the traditionally bland indifference
of the initial cosmic state?
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In a sense, of course, this has in fact happened, or at the very least a
route to it has been opened. The inflation hypothesis was devised in the
first place precisely to eliminate the supposed “fine-tuning” as well as to
respond to the so-called “horizon” problem. Highly speculative originally,
the hypothesis now has attained a degree of respectability. It has had to be
extensively reworked along the way, and still faces some difficult challenges. And it is not clear that it has entirely eliminated the need for “finetuning” on its own account. But the degree of success that the inflation
hypothesis has in fact enjoyed should make one very cautious indeed in
claiming the need for parameter constraints in the context of such contingent-seeming parameters as energy-density.
The nomic constraints, however, obviously have a quite different status.
The basic constraints have been measured with an impressive degree of
accuracy. The process, which, say, forms carbon by helium fusion, is reasonably well understood and the consequent parameter constraint is
straightforward to formulate. The basic constraints are, of course, theorydependent in numerous ways. But it seems safe to say that later theory, no
matter how different it may be, will turn up approximately the same
dimensionless numbers. And the numerous constraints that have to be
imposed on these numbers if a complex long-lived universe is to be allowed
to develop within the framework they define seem both too specific and too
numerous to evaporate entirely, as may well happen with the original “finetuning” claim for energy-density. Take a typical example: “A change of
only half a percent in the strong force would stop the helium fusion on
which the formation of carbon depends. . .”.10 It might happen, of course,
that an alternative account of the formation of carbon will be devised, one
that would dispense with the claimed constraint. But then a dozen or more
other similar constraints have been pointed out, each dependent on a different theory of how a certain sort of physical transformation occurs. Might
they all be replaced? Well, perhaps, but it surely seems a very long shot.
There are, however, several other quite different sorts of challenge to the
reality of the “fine-tuning” claim. The first is that a later super-theory might
well show that these constants, and the laws following from them, are interconnected, that they cannot, in principle, vary independently of one another.
So that one could not vary the strong force by 5%, say, without invoking a
cascade of other changes. Its present value might, in other words, be dependent on, or even necessitated by, the values of the remaining constants.
Might they not all vary together, then? Would some sort of “fine-tuning” persist in this case? We simply don’t know. It is one thing to suppose
that the initial cosmic energy-density might have been different; it seems, at
least, a contingent parameter. But the matter is otherwise with the laws of
physics themselves and with the dimensionless constants that appear in
them as pure numbers. Might they have been different? It is not clear that
science has an answer to this. What sort of theory would tell us what the
universe might have been like, even though it isn’t that way?
A suggestion that has sometimes been made (by Hawking, among others) is that it may turn out that the present values of the basic constants
have to be what they are, that a necessity binds the system as a whole. We
are surely far from such a theory as matters now stand. But one could
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point to the many unresolved issues in basic physics and cosmology right
now: the lack of integration between gravitational and quantum effects,
the growing “darkness” in cosmology, as “dark” energy has been added to
“dark” matter as yet another troubling question-mark. But that the longsought “final” theory that would bring all of these elements together
would show that the constants have to have the values they do, that no
other set is possible, raises a host of questions as to what that would even
mean. And, of course, even though such a theory would explain, in a
sense, why the constants have the values they have, it would leave open
the further question: is this still not itself significant? Might not a further
question be in order here?
A very different sort of objection to the whole idea of “fine-tuning” or
significant cosmic parameter constraint is that for it to have any force, there
would have to be a way to define the values of the probabilities involved.
And this is impossible, it is urged, since for one thing the required measure
function is non-normalizable. So the intuitions to which physicists like
Hawking and philosophers like Leslie appeal in this context are no better
than that: intuitions, and intuitions with nothing to back them.11
The issues here are complicated and I cannot do justice to them in short
space. First, the critics are right in one regard. I do not think that numerical probabilities can be assigned here, even though physicists as eminent as
Hawking and more recently Lee Smolin12 have not hesitated to do so. It is
important to distinguish here between the two types of possible constraint:
on a parameter like initial energy-density which could take any one of a
wide range of values as far as the relevant theories are concerned; or on a
basic physical constant like the strength-ratio between one of the four fundamental forces and the other three. The notion of fine-tuning was originally attached to the first of these only. And in this case, the idea of a small
constrained range compared to a much larger possible one might seem to
offer a handhold for a probability estimate.
Some of the critics at this point assume that the larger range here would
have to be infinite, and then have little difficulty in showing that this
would lead to a zero probability for any finite range of the parameter.13
But, of course, none of the physicists involved would want to allow the
possible values of the energy-density to range to infinity. Their assumption is that the range is very large, so far as the relevant theories are concerned, large enough to make the postulated constraint significant. But
this would not yield a numerical estimate for the probability. The further
implicit assumption that each interval of the possible range is equally probable (required by normalizability in the absence of the alternative, a density
function over the range) could also be problematic. Far more problematic,
however, would be the application of probabilistic notions to possible variations in the fundamental physical constants. It is hard to see how this
could be theoretically grounded, since we obviously have no theory as to
how these constants might vary. Thus defenders of the necessity for “finetuning” would seem to be ill-advised to introduce numerical probability
estimates of any sort here.
But who says that in the absence of a numerical estimate that Bayesians
can work with, the notion of a required parameter constraint collapses?
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Such a constraint violates the Principle of Indifference and the tighter the
constraint that theory ordains relative to the plausible finite range of the
parameter, the more pressing the question becomes: can there be an explanation for the fact that the initial cosmic state was so constrained relative to
some later feature of the universe? No probability estimates are needed to
make this question meaningful. It is enough that a variation of only a tiny
percentage in the value of a dimensionless constant would exclude entirely
some later cosmic development like the formation of helium. What fine-tuning amounts to in cases like this has nothing to do with probability estimates.
But there are as we have seen, serious questions about the direction
future theory may take and about how to understand the idea of nomic
variability that underlies the supposition that the fundamental constants
might have had values other than those they actually do have. On the
assumption, however, that the “fine-tuning” is real, two alternatives
remain, both of them anthropic.
c. Many-world: Given a multiplicity of actual worlds over which the relevant parameter ranges sufficiently widely, an anthropic selection effect
would, as we have seen, explain the fact that the parameter took on the
constrained value it did. It would explain away the appearance of a deliberate fine-tuning on the part of a Maker. But there would have to be reason other than this alone to make such an ontologically extravagant postulate plausible. That is, there would have to be a physical theory implying
the existence of this profusion of worlds, a theory for which there is independent evidence in the world we inhabit. If fine-tuning of the second
kind, that is, of the basic constants, is in question, then one would need a
theory requiring such a multiverse.
There are such theories, notable among them those of Andrei Linde.
Their existence should at least make us pause. But whether sheer technical
ingenuity in the absence of testable consequence is enough to confer plausibility is questionable. If a multiverse of the Linde type, displaying physical
laws of all sorts in different bubbles of space-time, were to exist, an anthropic selection effect would assuredly operate. But this of itself is far from
enough to warrant belief that we do inhabit such a bubble. Much more
would be needed to make the multiverse alternative an appealing option.
d. Purposive fine-tuning: The remaining alternative, assuming the initial
cosmic constraints to be real, is to suppose that they have been purposely
“tuned” in this way in order to accomplish the ends of the Tuner, and these
are further assumed to include the existence of humans. (Obviously a nonanthropic motive could also be postulated: there are many other possible
reasons why a Tuner might want a universe of the sort that would also
accommodate humans.)
Appeal to a Creator has a particular advantage over the multiverse alternative in the context of properly nomic constraints. As we have seen, asking
how the basic constants might in principle vary and what sorts of limit one
should impose on such a variation given the physics of the universe we
have (our only source of scientific evidence) runs into all sorts of difficulty.
There may be relations of necessity between the constants of which we
remain unaware, though it would be very difficult to believe that no other
physics than one featuring the present values of the basic constants is even

612

Faith and Philosophy

metaphysically possible. But even if there are internal limits of necessity on
these constants in the context of the universe we have, we could ask: why a
universe of this sort, one which makes the advent of the human possible,
given that an entirely different universe, one governed by a quite different
physics, seems metaphysically possible. Appeal to a Creator (not to a Maker
constrained by the materials available) would provide an answer to this.
This is not a scientific hypothesis. Recalling the archaeologist who finds
an incised bone deep in the earth that may or may not testify to a human
presence in that location at a specific period, one would have to investigate
the likelihood of such a Creator in the first place. And this would necessarily lead, as we have seen, in metaphysical and theological directions. There
is no way that the natural sciences, on their own resources, could support,
or for that matter exclude, such an hypothesis. Does this rule it out, as a
good many of those who have entered the anthropic debate clearly
assume? I would say not, but to hold this possibility open would, of
course, need extended argument on its own account.
A Creator of the sort that informs the Western religious tradition would,
as we have seen, explain fine-tuning, to the extent that such fine-tuning
exists. Such a Creator according to this tradition is already held to be
responsible for the existence and nature of the cosmos, and would therefore incorporate in the work of Creation whatever further constraints the
Creator’s purposes might include. This is not a challenge to the sciences; it
supplements their findings by covering an issue of cosmic origins that can
reasonably be said to lie outside their domain. (Again, argument is needed
here in regard to recent claims about vacuum fluctuations and the like.)
The crucial question here is the ancient metaphysical one: Ought we simply take the existence of the universe for granted, on the assumption that
causal argument of the conventional sort fails at that level? Or ought we
postulate a transcendent causal agency of some kind, one with an interest
in human existence besides, for the anthropic argument to work?14
Suppose one were to pass over the difficulties in establishing the reality
of the fine-tuning feature of cosmic origins itself, would the anthropic
argument offer independent reason to believe in the existence of a Maker of
the sort the argument would require? I am hesitant to answer this in the
affirmative, even though the logic of theory-support might suggest that I
should.15 And the reason is the same as that already outlined in the case of
the other anthropic argument, the many-world one. In both cases, a giant
ontological leap is required. To confer some initial plausibility and to allay
the suspicion that the proposed explanation is ad hoc, entirely contrived,
one has to show that the hypothesis is coherent, that the entity being proposed by way of explanation is accessible to our theorizing, scientific in
one case, metaphysical and theological in the other. With this assurance
given, the anthropic explanation might be held to confer additional plausibility. But then we run into the other difficulty: how sure can we be of the
explanation itself, the alleged fact of fine-tuning? All in all, then, the
anthropic argument would seem a weak reed as a motive for belief in a
Creator. It is consonant with such belief if that belief is already there. And
that in it is enough, certainly, to commend it to our interest.
In the end, however, all four alternatives have to be kept in mind. And
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balancing their relative likelihood, even in the roughest way, makes
demands of an unusual epistemic sort. That is what has made this issue at
once so fascinating and so incapable of agreed solution.
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